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In this article we place Tony Lawson’s account of contrast explanation in context. 
Lawson’s development of it is given meaning both by the roots of the approach in his 
work on social ontology and the state of economics that provides the grounds for the 
critique contained in that social ontology. This is important because such an approach to 
explanation is not new. Most notably van Fraassen and Garfinkel have developed it in 
particular ways and for particular purposes within the philosophy of science and social 
theory. Setting out the different ways in which the contrastive approach has been 
developed is useful for identifying what is different about Lawson’s approach, its 
potential and limits. Lawson’s proposal is more modest and focusses on causal 
investigation in a manner that flows from his approach to social ontology. Contrast 
explanation provides a substitute for controlled experiments and facilitates identifying 
social mechanisms. It also enables exploration of the manifold presuppositions of our 
explanatory questions. We argue that this is a useful and important contribution to 
overcoming some of the many problems economics faces.       
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Introduction: contrast explanation as one approach to a generalised problem 
 
In Economics & Reality (1997, pp. 199-226) and Reorienting Economics Lawson 
develops his account of contrast explanation (2003, pp. 86-109; 2009, pp. 407-408). 
According to it the starting point for an explanatory project is an awareness of a tension. 
For example this may be an observation of a significant unexpected or unusual outcome 
in some particular context or ‘contrast space’, of sufficient interest (relative to current 
understandings) to provoke (and make worthwhile) a comparative ‘why’ question: ‘why 
x rather than y’. The latter expresses the contrast, between an observation and something 
that was expected.  The general form is simple and highly flexible. Lawson specifically 
introduces contrast explanation as a dialectically reasoned investigative approach that is 
compatible with, and can be developed in terms of, his longstanding work on social 
ontology (2009, pp. 405-406).  
Social ontology concerns the study of the nature of social reality. Lawson’s work 
on social ontology involves a wide-ranging critique of the current state of economics. 
Contrast explanation is an approach set out as one potential contribution to addressing 
the general problems of the claimed parlous state of economics. As such, Lawson’s use 
of contrast explanation is given meaning both by its roots in his work on social ontology 
and the state of economics that provides the grounds for the critique contained in that 
social ontology. This point is important. Contrast explanation is not new. It is an 
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approach articulated and developed in different ways within philosophy and across the 
social sciences. Not all of these ways coincide with Lawson’s concerns. Concomitantly, 
his use of contrast explanation and its relevance in economics can easily be 
misunderstood if isolated from its roots in social ontology. One issue is that the 
potentials for contrast explanation are partly expressed through the possibility of 
experimental conditions (which are a ‘special case’ of the grounds for contrast 
explanation). This can easily be misunderstood since mainstream economics stresses the 
possibility of progress through quasi-experimental research design.   
 In the sections that follow we first set out briefly the general context of economics 
within which social ontology has emerged. Our exposition serves two purposes. First it 
gives a sense of the conditions that have motivated a concern with social ontology and 
that continue to make it a relevant domain of argument within and for economics. The 
problems of economics are longstanding and widespread. Though there are differences 
in regard of the emphasis of critique there is also an underlying continuity and 
commonality to critique. It has consistently questioned the realism and relevance of the 
mainstream. What is considered “realistic” depends on our philosophical and social-
theoretical conception of reality. 
Second, we set out the key characteristics of contrast explanation as developed 
within philosophy and within the social sciences. This highlights two further points. 
First, social ontology shapes the scope of contrast explanation, and second, social 
ontology maintains the distinction between philosophical ontology, social-scientific 
ontology (social theory), and concrete claims about geo-historical reality. This is 
important because otherwise philosophy can appear to claim too much in terms of its 
role in and for social science and economics. We argue that Lawson’s approach to 
contrast explanation is positioned to avoid this problem. Contrast explanation, as noted, 
is not intended to, nor can it, settle all problems of how and what one researches. 
Rather, contrast explanation, in its various guises, stresses the conceptual, pragmatic, 
ethical and political context of explanation. 
 
The significance of social ontology as a response to the state of economics  
 
Contemporary economics has been subject to widespread critique (e.g. Boyer, 2013; 
Dow, 2012; Fine, 2013; Fullbrook, 2009; Lawson, 2015; Harcourt, 2010; Hodgson, 
2009; Sawyer, 2011). One widely acknowledged aspect of this critique is that the 
history of economic thought and the methodology and philosophy of economics are no 
longer typical constituents of an economics education (e.g. Morgan, 2015b). Over time 
this has meant that these research fields are no longer constitutive for the majority of 
academic economists. As such, the latter cannot easily draw on the noted fields as 
sources of insight and expertise in the construction of theory, in applied work, and in the 
broader critical engagement between theories and applications.  
Although the mainstream has tended to become less concerned with realism it has 
not eschewed claims of applied relevance, or simply shed a language of realism. Rather 
the way in which these are expressed has been shaped by the fundamentals of the 
mainstream.1 Theory is produced with caveats (‘this form may be applicable to reality’), 
theory is held to different standards (is the realism of axioms etc. really an issue?), 
models are defended, developed and critiqued according to a language of progress, 
where the model is stated as ‘more realistic’, but where the model tries, arguably, to 
                                                          
1 Dani Rodrik (2015) provides the most articulate contemporary illustration of the points we set out here. 
Syll (2016) provides an excellent critique. 
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render a ‘more realistic’ version of an unrealism. Discussion of methods recognizes 
problems, but again expresses those problems within a discourse of ‘progress’, typically 
subsuming problems within the ordinary course of science, as a continual struggle in 
pursuit of rigour. So, widespread problems such as an inability to converge on a 
comprehensive set of variables, an inability to reproduce coefficients, an inability to 
generate insights that hold in empirically meaningful ways beyond an experiment or 
laboratory situation, and continual problems of forecasting and prediction, become 
hallmarks of the activity of science rather than a reason to acknowledge that the entire 
enterprise may fail to be scientific. This being so, if the mainstream had a maxim, it 
would be: recognizing failure but phrasing it through progress is no failure at all...  
A language of progress resists recognizing that failure may be endemic, and 
resists recognizing that endemic failure may have underlying features. This has 
remained the case through the period of formalism in the later twentieth century and 
into the contemporary era, sometimes referred to as the ‘empirical turn’ (and more 
latterly the ‘credibility revolution’) in mainstream economics. Throughout, mainstream 
economics has changed, innovated and diversified, but it has not transformed. In some 
ways its ability to resist fundamental change have actually been augmented. For 
example, as the work of Fred Lee and various collaborators establishes, the Research 
Assessment Exercise (RAE) and Research Excellence Framework (REF) in the UK 
have resulted in the gradual elimination of non-mainstream economists from the 
majority of economics departments because they are less likely to publish in core 
mainstream journals (e.g. Lee et al, 2013; however, see also Colander, 2009; Colander, 
2010). The elimination reduces the scope for mainstream economists and also for 
students to be exposed to a wider range of positions and ideas within economics.  
The insularity fostered by the selection processes of the mainstream, combined 
with the status effects of the pervasiveness of economics (which inter alia give the 
impression of non-insularity through the conflation of pervasive with invasive) have, 
arguably, positioned the mainstream as a knowledge reproducing form able to deflect 
accusations of failure. This has been repeatedly demonstrated: mainstream economics 
remains basically unaffected by the widespread critique that followed the global 
financial crisis, and it remains essentially unresponsive (and in some cases responsively 
hostile) to the student organizations that have subsequently emerged because of that 
critique.2  
The point we want to emphasise here is that critique has consistently questioned 
the realisticness and relevance of the mainstream. It has done so with reference to its 
theory, its models and its empirical claims based on methods used. It has done so with 
reference to the mainstream’s ability to reproduce itself in ways that are centrifugal for 
alternatives and centripetal for core commitments that perpetuate problems of realism, 
even as the mainstream changes. The mainstream is highly influential in the real world, 
but based on a discourse that acknowledges yet deflects problems of its own 
realisticness.  
In this context the work of the Cambridge Social Ontology Group (CSOG) and 
Lawson has been of huge value within economics (Morgan, 2016a; Lee and Cronin, 
2016; Jo et al, 2017). Clearly, critique of the mainstream in terms of particular theory, 
models and methods has always been methodologically and philosophically informed. 
The work of Marx, Keynes, Veblen, Sraffa, Hayek, and many others since, involve 
basic claims that their targets were inadequate as ways to theorise and explore real 
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Thinking (INET). See Association for Heterodox Economics (2014).  
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economies.3 The work of CSOG and of Lawson has provided a way to capture the 
commonality of critique and so potentially commensurate the concerns of these multiple 
points of view.   
CSOG and Lawson have provided an important body of work beginning from 
methodology and philosophy of economics (see Downward, 2003; Fleetwood, 1999; 
Fullbrook, 2009; Lawson et al, 2007; Lewis, 2004; Pratten, 2015). That work has made 
use of history of economic thought, and also ‘immanent critique’ of different aspects of 
economics, in order to develop economics as also social theory (Lawson, 1997; Lawson 
2003).4 As such, it has demonstrated the general relevance of methodology, philosophy, 
history of economic thought and social theory for the economist. At the same time, in so 
far as it has attempted to capture the commonality of concerns with being realistic it has 
also shifted the terms of debate of methodology and philosophy of economics. To a 
significant degree, prior to the work of CSOG and Lawson, methodology and 
philosophy of economics, had become sub-disciplines, facilitating the concerns of the 
mainstream (though ironically were often considered mainly irrelevant). Those involved 
explored economics with reference to the quasi-natural science status of economics and 
drew on dominant theories in analytical philosophy of science. As such, the terms of 
analysis were always about standards and foci that neither the mainstream nor more 
pluralistic or heterodox economics could achieve.   
Work on social ontology has gradually shifted the emphasis from paradigms, 
research programmes, positivism, empiricism, verification etc. to the more fundamental 
question: what would economic reality have to be like in order for the approaches 
pursued to be appropriate? This deceptively simple question has opened up a different 
way to explore the arising issues in economics. The work has resonated with the 
concerns already articulated in the methodological and philosophical aspects of existing 
critique, whilst also providing a new framework for assessing the consistency of both 
the mainstream and heterodox alternatives (compare chapters 3 and 4, Lawson, 2015a). 
It has thereby provided a means for heterodox economists to make sense of the multiple 
aspects of critique of the mainstream, but also to make sense of potential commonalities 
within heterodox economics as alternatives. Moreover, it has done so in ways able both 
to express the potentials of existing heterodox approaches and also to support new non-
mainstream approaches (beyond existing schools).5  
One might, therefore, argue that CSOG and the work of Lawson is, though rooted 
in methodology and philosophy of economics, more appropriately understood as 
transcending the boundaries of methodology and philosophy, at least in terms of the 
way the two had become sub-disciplinary. The work has provided a way to make 
explicit what has always been implicit: that heterodoxy and non-mainstream economics 
                                                          
3 Referring to these well-known names is not intended to detract from or silence the work of subsequent 
and more contemporary contributors (a problem Thomas Palley notes in his Gattopardo economics essay)  
4 Immanent critique explores the presuppositions, substantive premises, and truth-claims where 
multiplicity converges within some field of inquiry. It considers the terms under which tensions, 
contradictions and problems arise, and addresses itself to those. As such, immanent critique is variety of 
applied philosophy. It is not an alien discourse imposed on a field because its very form is rooted in the 
problematics of the field in which it is immersed. However, the intention is to seek ways to transcend 
common problematics, so tensions do arise.      
5 This has also had an organizational basis. Lawson has been editor of the Routledge Economics as Social 
Theory book series for many years. The series has published many important and diverse works, 
including for example Nancy Folbre’s Who Pays for the Kids (1994). Lawson’s work has for example, 
also been influential across subjects as diverse as ecological economics (see Spash, 2013) and business 
studies (see Jackson et al, 2016). 
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are often the realistic alternatives to scientism.6 Within this function, CSOG and the 
work of Lawson have contributed to a constructive pluralism, rather than a narrow 
technical pluralism (see Dow, 2004; Dobusch and Kapeller 2012).7  
However, the contributions and significance of the work of CSOG and of Lawson 
are not limited to critique but involves reconstruction, especially in terms of contrast 
explanation. We argue that Lawson’s approach to contrast explanation has a history and 
context in the development of economics. The particular issues and problems of 
economics have in turn created the concern with ontology, and with realism in 
particular. Lawson makes this quite explicit in the main paper he has written on contrast 
explanation (subsequent to its introduction in Economics & Reality and Reorienting 
Economics). In 2009 Cambridge Journal of Economics ran a special section, ‘The 
intellectual legacy of Brian Reddaway’. Lawson’s contribution is an extended 
illustration of contrast explanation using George Akerlof’s well-known ‘The market for 
‘lemons’’ (2009). In the introduction Lawson states: 
 
The modern discipline of economics, or at least its dominant mainstream branch, 
has, to a fairly significant extent, lost touch with the real world… the reason for 
this state of affairs is the more or less compulsory focus on formalistic models: we 
[Reddaway and I] shared the assessment that, by their nature, the sorts of models 
that economists use preclude the uncovering of very much real insight into social 
reality, given its nature. Furthermore, we were both convinced that realistic 
assessments of economic developments remained entirely feasible… my concern 
has been to elaborate this nature, and to investigate whether any insights obtained 
by doing so can provide some kind of aid to socio-explanatory enquiry. In short, 
my preferred path has been to turn to the philosophy of social science, and in 
particular to social ontology (the study of the nature of social reality)… However 
he [Reddaway] did often impress upon me the following point. If one of my goals 
was to seek out and emphasise approaches to social explanation that went largely 
unrecognized in the discipline, it would be helpful to provide illustrations of how 
they work. (Lawson, 2009, pp. 405-406)    
 
Positioning Lawson’s use of the concept of contrast explanation   
 
Lawson’s account of a contrast explanation has a particular relevance within economics 
because it is grounded in his prior work (and that of CSOG) in response to the 
recognized and ongoing problems of economics. However, the notion of contrast 
explanation is not new, and so has meaning independently of Lawson’s use of the term. 
This opens up the possibility that Lawson’s use is relatively distinctive.   
Though it has antecedents, the concept of contrast explanation is typically 
attributed to van Fraassen in his The Scientific Image (1980). As Michael Friedman 
states in his contemporary review The Scientific Image is a work in post-positivist 
analytical philosophy of science (1982). It is a procedural analytical argument for what 
science is, following the claimed failure of positivism to adequately account for the 
                                                          
6 Where scientism broadly follows Hayek’s use of the term: the inappropriate use of and understanding of 
scientific method for the particular purposes it is then applied to (though not necessarily involving the 
politicisation of knowledge that Hayek also associates with the term). 
7 Though this remains controversial. Many still argue for the superiority of a given position or school 
either as theory or as already articulating the insights claimed via social ontology. The relation to 
Marxism has been one of the main foci for this debate, see Brown et al 2002, Brown 2007, O’Boyle and 
McDonough, 2011, Creaven, 2000.  
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nature of (natural) science. Contrast explanation is introduced in chapter five as a 
general model of what a causal scientific explanation consists of. The concept is 
thereafter critiqued, defended and developed in various ways within analytical 
philosophy (notably by Lipton, 1990; Hitchcock, 1996, 1999; and Botterill, 2010). 
Garfinkel (1981) also introduced the concept of contrastive question forms at about the 
same time as van Fraassen. However, his concerns were rather different, focused more 
specifically on issues of social theory. Again, this work has been variously critiqued and 
developed within social theory (beginning with Hollis’s review in 1982). 
 
Both van Fraassen’s and Garfinkel’s work have been drawn on in subsequent discourse 
regarding the nature of causation and concerning the problem of what there is to 
explain. This has become part of discourses of the nature of theory and method in a 
range of fields; for example, in international studies, most recently in works by 
Grynaviski (2011) and Humphreys (2016; cf. Patomäki 2016). It is important to note, 
therefore, that contrast explanation is not original to Lawson and nor is it tied to a given 
position in philosophy or to social ontology.8 Setting out key aspects of van Fraassen 
and Garfinkel’s work provides a useful comparative way to situate Lawson’s account of 
contrast explanation in and for economics.  
 
Van Fraassen: contrast explanation within the philosophy of science 
  
In The Scientific Image van Fraassen sets out to reconstruct how natural science is 
conceived. Specifically, he sets out to refute both logical positivism and its variants and 
scientific realism, and in so doing, make a case for a pragmatic or ‘constructive 
empiricism’. His core claim is that science seeks to explain facts and events. However, 
merely to state that theory T explains fact E does not itself imply theory T is true, will 
continue to be empirically adequate and will thereafter always be acceptable. Many 
theories over time have satisfied the statement theory T explains fact E, but have 
ultimately failed to be true, empirically adequate (since anomalies and contexts in which 
they fail arise) and accepted (they have been rejected, superseded, encompassed by 
other theories etc.). For van Fraassen this means that scientific realism cannot be an 
adequate account of science, since such realism requires that an explanation is true and 
science aims to find true theories (a position he associates in particular with Hilary 
Putnam).9 Instead, one can only state ‘that we have an explanation is most simply 
construed as meaning we have ‘on the books’ an acceptable theory that explains’ (1980, 
p. 100). 
To be clear, the implication is not that theory is and can be entirely false or 
irrelevant, merely that the definitive truth of theory is not established by science. 
Science is most appropriately conceived in terms of ‘the basic relation of explanation, 
which may be said to hold between facts relative to a theory, quite independently of 
whether the theory is true or false’ (1980, p101). As such, science is focused on the 
continual establishment of the empirical adequacy of what can be observed (1980, p. 
                                                          
8 Note, Lawson is clearly aware of this, since he references Lipton in Lawson, 1997, and van Fraassen, 
Lipton and Garfinkel in his 2009 paper (and briefly in Lawson, 2003). However, since his focus is to 
develop his own work on contrast explanation he does no more than acknowledge that ‘various aspects of 
the account defended here are paralleled in writings elsewhere’ (2009, p. 408). In addition to ‘various’ 
and ‘parallel’ the difference is also instructive for the significance of social ontology.       
9 We put aside the critique of logical positivism, since the realist critique is more germane for social 
ontology and Lawson’s work. 
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151). This weakens its epistemic commitment to no more than that a theory is 
empirically adequate if it can be established that it fits what is observed (and one can 
remain non-committed to the truth of the unobservables expressed in theory). So, whilst 
not reduced to what is observed, the fulcrum of science becomes what is observed, and 
the status of the practice of science remains conditional and contingent - hence 
pragmatic or constructive empiricism. At the same time, since the purpose of science is 
to explain, it is the nature of explanation that must be reconstructed by the analytical 
philosopher (in the aftermath of logical positivism and scientific realism). It is here that 
van Fraassen begins to introduce contrast explanation. 
According to van Fraassen ‘science gives a picture of the world as a net of 
interconnected events’ (1980: p. 123) focused on explanation where (1980, p. 124): 
 
1. Events are enmeshed in a net of causal relations 
2. What science describes is the causal net 
3. Explanations of why an event happens consists (typically) in an exhibition of 
salient factors in the part of the causal net formed by lines ‘leading up’ to that 
event 
4. Those salient factors mentioned in an explanation constitute (what are ordinarily 
called) the cause(s) of that event 
 
For van Fraassen 1 & 2 concern the general structure of causation. In The Scientific 
Image he has relatively little to say about this other than to suggest, in accordance with 
use of the terminology of a ‘causal net’, and a focus on ‘leading up’ to an event, that 
science investigates causal relations as complex causal processes, and that these can be 
conceptualised as a spatio-temporal continuous series of events. Explanation then 
becomes an intervention into the continuous process.10 The nature of the intervention is 
the subject matter of 3 & 4 and it is these with which he is primarily concerned: the 
development of a general framework for how scientific explanation is structured. 
For van Fraassen, an explanation follows from a why question. Any meaningfully 
stated why question for explanatory purposes has two key components (1980, pp 124-
129). First, it has a position or context dependence, which shapes the question form as 
an explanatory investigation. So, a mechanic, a lawyer and a doctor would pursue quite 
different aspects and emphases in regard of a death in a motor accident (the cause of 
interest and statement of that cause could be: a defect in the breaks, the negligence of 
                                                          
10  Note, much of van Fraassen’s approach here is a reconstruction of W. C. Salmon’s work. The most 
notable feature of the approach for our purposes is that the overwhelming focus is on causation and 
events. However, there is no proper distinction made between what causes events and a continual 
production of events that are caused (are events merely the product of events?). The problem is not that 
van Fraassen’s work is incompatible with a complex structuring of the grounds of events, but rather that 
he has little to say about what the distinctions may be. In one passage he distinguishes real and pseudo 
processes: so, the location of a car is a consequence of its motion as a continuous series of events, and this 
is a real process (where it has been is responsible for where it is going to be), but the shadow of the car is 
not a product of where the car has been, but rather of where the car is now and the location of the sun - 
the shadow tracks the car, but this is a pseudo process. In another passage, whilst providing a constructive 
critique of J. L. Mackie’s  (1965 and 1980) INUS, he notes Aristotle’s typology of causation is not central 
to modern theories of causation, yet later he draws on the typology (without endorsing the metaphysics) 
to support his own argument for positioned contrast explanations, where he also notes there is some 
structure of causation to be accounted for (1980, p. 131). Ultimately he resists making any claims or 
drawing any inferences about the structure of causation since this might weaken his claim that science can 
make no claims about reality through its use of theory, and that its appropriate focus is empirical 
adequacy of observables (constructive empiricism). See later comments on ontology.  
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the driver subsequent to the vulnerability of the breaks, or severe head trauma). This 
creates a conditional relevance for investigation within which salient factors are 
selected. Second, the why question form, at least implicitly, involves contrasts in terms 
of specifying possible alternatives to X happening, providing a ‘contrast-class’.11 It is 
by exploring the particular case, based on the context (positioning and purpose of the 
participants in the investigation), and through a selection of contrasts (of what happened 
informed by the context) that one identifies the causes for what did occur (with 
reference to what could and did not).  
One might be tempted here to infer that van Fraassen’s account of explanation is 
judgmentally relative, in the sense any and all answers are accepted purely because 
there can be different positions and answers. However, contrast explanation is intended 
to be intrinsically relative but not judgmentally relative. He remains committed to the 
possibility of objectivity regarding evidence. Van Fraassen’s purpose is to establish that 
any investigation of actual events, where an explanation is sought, must be positioned 
and involve a contrast-class (1980, p. 129). A god-like being with access to all 
information about any given event would still require a positioned and contrastive 
question form in order to state an explanation of that event. Why did x occur as it did 
rather than y can only meaningfully be answered from positions (e.g. doctor, lawyer, 
mechanic) and can only make sense in terms of the unfolding of events in time. The 
only difference god-like status would confer is the capacity to construct any and all 
relevant explanations from any and all positions based on determinably good 
information or evidence.  
Van Fraassen’s aim is to set out criteria for what an explanation is, subject to the 
analytical structure of a question (1980, pp. 141-152). Within context and based on 
contrasts, an explanation invites an answer.12 For that answer to be accepted (to be 
considered an adequate direct answer) the explanatory factors selected must be relevant, 
they must be subject to evaluation and they must be accepted as good. Van Fraassen 
(1980: p. 126) argues that ‘no factor is explanatorily relevant unless it is scientifically 
relevant; and among the scientifically relevant factors context determines explanatorily 
relevant ones’. It seems curious then that the development of the concept is illustrated 
through socially situated examples (doctor, mechanic etc.).13 In any case, at this point 
van Fraassen returns to his primary argument, that science is concerned with the 
establishment of the empirical adequacy of what can be observed. The role of theory is 
                                                          
11 Note, clearly van Fraassen is not asserting that all questions are why questions or that all why questions 
are followed by causal explanations (why is 6 even and 7 odd need not invoke a causal explanation). His 
focus is on the general expectation in the use of terms in scientific discourse. In social science all kinds of 
responses may be evinced by questions - moral issues etc and these may be non-causal accounts. Note 
also: there is some ambiguity in terms of van Fraassen’s use of the term concept-class, since the contrast 
could be the different ways in which an event could have occurred whilst still being investigated from a 
given position - and so the contrast class may be either alternatives to the event that occurred or 
alternative narratives of causal processes leading to the event that occurred. At some points in the text van 
Fraassen seems to mean one or the other of these. The combination markedly complicates the application 
of contrast-class approaches, since it multiplies with few limits the potential for contrast classes to be 
formulated. Moreover, the latter of the two meanings blurs into the claims about intrinsic aspects of the 
causes responsible for the event, and as such leads towards Botterill’s 2010 distinction (see later). 
12 Though the statement sounds silly when stated like this, as a developed argument the point is to 
distinguish between a proposition or hypothesis and an answer. 
13 In general, the majority of actual examples provided are everyday situations within society, combined 
with archetypical problem sets (paresis-syphilis, the flagpole etc), rather than fundamental problems of 
well-known natural science theories. The latter may require context but this is very different as an issue 
for theory legitimation than it is for practical applications for a doctor, lawyer or mechanic (Friedman, 
1982. p. 281). 
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to inform pragmatic investigation. This raises the question of what is meant by theory. 
Van Fraassen’s core claim is that science seeks to explain empirically observed facts 
and events. In many of his examples van Fraassen seems committed to the event 
regularity view of scientific theory. What matters is empirical adequacy, not truth. 
Science is focused on the continual establishment of the empirical adequacy of what can 
be observed (1980, p. 151). This implies, among other things, that we should be 
agnostic about unobservables.14 Moreover, for van Fraassen much of science is 
probabilistic and covered by standard frequency-based statistical approaches.  
As one might expect, once the concept of a contrast explanation had been 
introduced into philosophy of science others began to explore its limits within that 
discourse. For example, Lipton (1990) phrases the contrast as that between a fact and a 
foil and then addresses the problem of reduction where, instead of why x rather than y, 
one can separate out and have merely why x (and a distinct why not y).15 Lipton argues 
that there is a link in the practice of explanation between why x and why not y because 
of a ‘difference condition’: there is a cause in the causal process for x that is (or would 
be) absent in y. Identifying this cause becomes part of inference to the best explanation, 
which in turn enables claims of explanatory success, which in turn provide a warrant for 
theory that informed the investigation.  
However, as Hitchcock (1996, 1999) then argues, if one applies a contrastive 
question form, where a given cause makes the difference, then one becomes open to the 
critique that determinism applies (1999, p. 595). Yet in introducing the original term 
van Fraassen argues towards a probabilistic account of cause and as Hitchcock notes, 
Lipton’s version fails to properly differentiate deterministic from indeterminist 
situations.16 Hitchcock then sets out to refute a ‘contrast explanation implies 
determinism’ (CEID) thesis (1999, p. 586) on the basis that it is too restrictive and 
follows more from an unjustified expectation of what science can achieve. Finally, 
Botterril (2010) shifts the focus to the problem of explanation as an intervention into a 
causal process. Specifically, the requirement to explain invokes, via David Lewis, 
Mill’s ‘problem of limitation’: if any given event (or phenomenon) has a causal history 
then intuitively the more of and longer that history (possible conditions of the event) is 
expressed in the explanation (the answer) then the better the explanation (as Mill puts it: 
the ‘real cause is the whole of the antecedents’ cited Botterril, 2010); yet science must 
select and must limit according to some criteria and some demonstrable consequences, 
in order to be science. According to Botterril, relevance and adequacy guide 
investigation and there are two types of questions one might pursue: contrastive why 
questions and descriptive-as-explanatory how questions. Here, Botterril goes some way 
to reproducing the decomposition Lipton wants to refute (why x separated from a why 
not y). However, Botterril is clear that why and how are differentiated by emphasis and 
separated as a matter of degree only. A how question provides a tighter focus on the 
                                                          
14 In our view, there is a lot of confusion about this debate about unobservables. Observable is not 
reducible to what can be seen by eye, one can observe by trace or response etc. The more we allow for 
theory, interpretation and technology in “observability”, the more we can observe. For instance on 14 
March 2013, CERN confirmed that they are likely to have observed a Higgs boson. See Patomäki, 2014. 
15 Following standard philosophical nomenclature and practice P not Q is used. Since Lawson uses x and 
y we have altered the symbols to ensure consistency. The originals contain theorems stated in standard set 
theoretic form which the reader can consult for a sense of the framing of the discourse: a critique of 
logical positivism etc, but one that remains within the same modes of expression and sympathetic to 
many of the goals. See further comments. 
16 Indeterminist is taken to mean that events could still be otherwise despite the factors expressed in the 
causal history, and this can then be stochastic.   
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specific mechanisms that are responsible for the event rather than the elimination of 
those that did not.                         
 
The limits of analytical philosophy of science and the implications for ontology  
 
Setting out the material here seems to have taken us some way from a direct concern 
with economics and also with Lawson’s work. However, that is the point. If one 
considers the above then the terms of argument and thus of development of contrast 
explanation have particular limits. Contrast explanation is developed as a solution to 
longstanding issues in philosophy of science. In this development, contrast explanation 
is not a method per se, but rather a claimed structure of what a question form must look 
like as part of a scientific investigation. For van Fraassen such investigation cannot be 
conceived in logical positivist terms. However, the structure of argument in The 
Scientific Image is also specifically set out to refute a particular conceptualisation of 
scientific realism and to focus significance on observable events. So contrast 
explanation is situated as empiricist and the mode of argument is set out using analytical 
philosophical methods - including expression in symbolic logic (an approach conducive 
to the use of theorems and demonstration proofs - something participants to the 
discourse variously apply when considering the coherence of contrastive questions). 
Moreover, as Michael Friedman notes, van Fraassen remains quite close in method and 
sympathy to logical positivism, including in chapter 6 based on probability theory 
(1982: p. 275). 
 One might, of course, simply state that Lawson’s work is quite different from this. 
However, the implicit point is that the potential value of contrast explanation may be 
because of that difference. Consider again the general characteristics of the above: a 
philosophy of science pragmatic approach to theory (with a framing that continues to be 
influenced by the positivist position it tacitly rejects), based on potentially narrowly 
stated contrastive question forms (connecting together continuous flows of events), 
expressible in terms of symbolic logics and pursuable subject to probability. It is not 
difficult to imagine how van Fraassen’s contrast explanation could become part of 
current mainstream economics with little impact on the general tendencies of that 
economics (or of its subdisciplinary philosophy of science focus). It involves a framing 
that continues to be tacitly influenced by the positivist position it explicitly rejects. It is 
based on contrastive question forms aiming to connect together continuous flows of 
events. It is expressible in terms of symbolic logics and pursuable subject to probability 
implying stable frequencies. One should also note here that van Fraassen says little 
about the characteristics of the content of theory – particularly in terms of 
unobservables – and so one could easily infer that theory can reasonably include 
assumptions as idealizations, or axioms as analytical constructs, as long as the whole 
then passed (or at least pursued) some test of observables. To adopt van Fraassen’s 
work within economics based on all of the above would probably be to do a disservice 
to his overall intent and that of subsequent contributors (see van Fraassen, 2008). But 
that is neither here nor there in terms of the potential.  
Notably, van Fraassen’s way of introducing contrast explanation potentially 
breaks the link between a critique of scientism and a realist alternative in the social 
sciences. Recall that van Fraassen positions scientific realism as the claim that science 
aims to find true theories and true explanations. However, actual theory and 
explanations are accepted as good at some point in time, but subsequently rejected or 
superseded. Based on the demonstrated impossibility of definitive non-trivial truth 
claims, van Fraassen develops an account where explanation is relative to theory, and 
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explanation is positioned by both context and the findings of investigation. As such, the 
whole is conditional at a point in time and contingent through time. This is then used to 
argue for an observation-focused empiricism. However, despite van Fraassen’s critique 
of scientific realism that critique does not amount to an adequate refutation of 
philosophical realism (an ontology), but rather of a specific epistemic claim about 
absolute or fixed truth claims. Quite apart from whether van Fraassen’s approach to 
scientific realism is a reasonable interpretation of Hilary Putnam’s work (see Groff, 
2004; Norris, 2002; Chakravartty, 2007) one can also reverse the line of reasoning. One 
might argue that it is an epistemic fallacy to use the fallibility of theory to reject that 
theory is of the real world (is meaningfully real world oriented), and so realism (not 
definitive truth claims) is representative of what science seeks to do and can achieve.17 
Moreover, it is precisely the conditionality of theory and the contingency of claims in 
and through time that make ontological realism relevant. This has been a key insight 
advanced by Lawson and various others via CSOG.   
Because reality is irreducible to any existing theory one can defend 
epistemological relativism.  But without ontological realism there would be no sense to 
the scientific process at all, since there could be no currently adequate conditional 
claims for how things are. There could be no possibility of artificially isolating 
conditions to produce regular relations, and no way of using insights about these to help 
make things using ‘how things are’, and help shape things based on ‘what could be’ 
based on how things can be made to happen. Fundamentally, there would either be 
nothing to ask a contrastive question of the form why x rather than y about, because 
there would always be either x or y as a regular outcome, or there would be no point in 
asking the question because nothing learned in the given case would inform any future 
intervention in the world, since there would be nothing to relatively consistently cause 
outcomes. So, from an explicitly ontological position, much of van Fraassen’s account 
seems to be vulnerable to realist counter-critique, where the most plausible claims made 
are actually supportive of a variety of ontological realism. That is, based on truth 
seeking regarding a real world that is differentiated, structured, layered, causally 
efficacious, open-systemic and so on, rather than truth identity as a required 
characteristic of the rationale of truth seeking.  
The reversal of van Fraassen’s position makes it clear that the terms of 
explanation require more to be said about the nature of causal-processes. Arguably, it is 
the powers, capacities etc. of aspects of reality, which produce events and processes. It 
is these aspects, which give meaning to ‘why’ questions. This extends from the natural 
to the social sciences and to economics. It is insufficient to claim that a causal network 
of events predates any given event, since this says little about whether reality is no more 
or less than a continuous series of events; one shifts from an agnosticism in terms of 
theory to a significant lacunae in how one conceives of the structuring of reality from 
which events can arise. Van Fraassen’s work, can thus illustrate the importance of 
ontological argument and of developing concepts within this domain of argument, 
something Lawson does. In van Fraassen’s case one ought also to emphasise its focus is 
mainly philosophy of science rather than implications for social science.18 This also is 
                                                          
17 An epistemic fallacy is where one collapses issues of ontology (what may be) into issues of 
epistemology (what and how things can be known) 
18 Again, to be clear here, van Fraassen positions much of what could be ontological argument in terms of 
the structure of causal processes (1980, p. 124) and then sets this aside. He states that there are continual 
casual processes of events, and then says almost nothing about the differentiation of causes from events 
(so causes may simply be prior events rather than the powers of things that are exercised through intrinsic 




important, because if the events, outcomes, situations and so forth to be explained are 
produced, then the nature of the reality that produces them is a significant issue for the 
scope of explanation. Any science of society must have a sense of what is particular to 
society that affects what there is to explain, and how explanation can be appropriately 
pursued. As a general work in philosophy of science, van Fraassen has little to say about 
this. However, Garfinkel’s work on contrastive question forms is more specifically 
focused on issues of ontology and social theory. As such, it provides a further useful 
point of comparison we might then use to position Lawson’s approach to contrast 
explanation. 
 
Garfinkel: contrastive questions and structure in the social sciences   
  
Like van Fraassen’s, Garfinkel’s work also has a particular position and purpose. 
Though Garfinkel ranges across philosophy of science and social science, Forms of 
Explanation (1981) was written to refute reductive individualistic explanations of social 
phenomena and the ideological role this has played through its association with value-
free claims that illegitimately justify value-laden social outcomes. He argues that 
biological or psychological accounts of social activity are typically insufficient. They 
are micro-level. However, activity does not just have a micro-level but also a macro-
level or context. It is socially relational and structured. One can explore localised 
contexts but can continue to extend to broader and different frames of reference. 
Contrast explanation is introduced as a way to make sense of this. 
As with van Fraassen, for Garfinkel any non-trivial why question requiring a 
causal answer involves at least an implicit contrast. For example, a student is a member 
of a class, the class is graded according to a distribution. Therefore, what a student 
achieves as a grade is relative to what others achieve. If the assessment is an exam, one 
may be assessing individual content, but the assessment is a context subject to 
conditions. It would be a partial and inadequate explanation to claim a student achieved 
the top grade merely because he or she was intelligent. This achievement is also based 
on comparisons and collective constraints such as the norm of normal distribution of 
grades.  As such, one might ask: Why did student x achieve an A rather than student y?  
Thereafter, as van Fraassen also does, one can continue to add additional questions 
based on different ways of considering the problem of explanation. These are ‘contrast 
spaces’ (1981, p. 40).  For Garfinkel, contrast explanations can assist in making it 
explicit that social realities are usually relational and involve emergent properties in 
various ways. Moreover, actors and activities are not relational merely in a localised 
sense that each event had a set of specific or local enablements and constraints that 
structured it. Garfinkel’s concern is broader than this.  
Forms of Explanation is a critique of ‘value-free’ social science. Examples such 
as how one grades a class are used to indicate that contrast questions are at least implicit 
in any explanation of ‘why’ things happen. But the argument is also made that one can 
continue to shift the perspective of questions, and also expand the bounds of what is to 
be explained. Unlike van Fraassen, he does not simply consider that there are differently 
defined concerns for positions, based on examples such as doctors, lawyers, mechanics 
                                                                                                                                                                          
empiricism focused on explanation. As Friedman then also notes, the focus on weakened epistemic 
commitments via observables seems overly restrictive - no reason is given for claiming theory and 
empirical work trade purely on observation, and van Fraassen has little to say about the core issues that a 
theory of science actually provokes: what is the implication of and nature of justification for rational 
belief in a real world where not all is observable.   
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etc; there are also broader analyses of the role of each participant in a relational context. 
For Garfinkel this reveals that social outcomes are value-laden and causal explanations 
are value-oriented (what is justified, just, preferred, deemed acceptable etc). The 
corollary is a critique of varieties of social science that proceed as though they were not 
value-laden and value-oriented. For Garfinkel this includes positivist social science that 
seeks to emulate an image of the natural sciences. In particular, he focuses critique on 
reductively individualistic accounts that place overwhelming emphasis on underlying 
invariant behaviours and traits, where those invariants are allowed to stand as adequate 
final explanations of the nature of society and of its outcomes.  
Garfinkel’s main focus is the problem of income inequality within societies. For 
Garfinkel, individualism justifies and hence perpetuates social problems like inequality 
by serving the function of attributing blame and praise. Individualistic accounts imply 
that the distribution of income is in the end determined by individuals’ given natures, 
characteristics, capabilities and effort. These kinds of explanation are to a large extent 
legitimising justifications for the existing distribution of wealth, power, and status. They 
exercise moral authority. Garfinkel positions his own work as a form of ethically 
naturalist anti-positivist social science, emphasising the need to justify the explanations 
one provides, and the broader consequences of the societies they are indicative of (and 
so also the inherent values). 
According to Garfinkel, structural explanations using contrastive questions in 
more encompassing contrast spaces will tend to bring to the fore underlying or more 
stable sets of causes, and so bring into sharper relief issues that are otherwise obscured. 
Concomitantly, his argument is not just about the importance of values, it is also 
explicitly political as a critique of free market ideology (notably focused on Nozick).  It 
is value-based.    
 
Social ontology, social theory and claims about reality 
 
Garfinkel introduces contrast explanation in an overall argument that creates – 
notwithstanding its many insights – potential grounds for misunderstandings that social 
ontology in economics sets out specifically to avoid. Critique of Garfinkel’s work has 
oriented on its preference for macro-level explanation as though this entailed the 
individual no longer mattered (which surely was not his intent). It is an empirical matter 
whether macro-level explanations (or causes within causal complexes) are more 
significant (Webb, 1983, p. 816; for other early discussions on Garfinkel, see Turner, 
1984; Hollis, 1982). Garfinkel’s work has also been inadvertently vulnerable in so far as 
it blurs various distinctions as an argumentation form. From a realist perspective it tends 
to blur the distinction between ontology as a domain of argument, realism as one set of 
arguments within that domain, and what is specifically real as a claim about the world.19 
Social ontology in economics has approached this slightly differently in order to 
emphasise the distinctions and so avoid misunderstandings, some of which are 
particular to economics (see Lawson, 2003; Pratten, 2015). The work of Lawson and 
CSOG developed in response to the multiplicity of heterodoxy and the recognized 
oppressive strictures of the mainstream. As such, it has developed in a discursive 
context that has required sensitivity to pluralism, whilst maintaining a critical 
orientation via ontology that argues also for some kinds of commonality. Garfinkel’s 
work is not positioned in this way and is not an explicitly ontologically posed position 
                                                          
19 Forms of Explanation is not a work on ontology. It might be categorised as pragmatist. However it has 
clear realist family resemblance and Garfinkel was a student of Hilary Putnam.  
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and so does not make similar distinctions in the way contrast explanation is introduced 
and pursued.  
Based on Lawson’s work social ontology is firstly a domain of argument. One 
raises questions about what characteristics, conditions, capacities etc. are implicitly or 
explicitly required or implied for theories and methods to be effective or justified. There 
can be many different approaches to social ontology and many different approaches to 
what is effective and what is justified. In this sense an argument for social ontology is 
no more or less than the claim that one cannot avoid having an ontology so it is 
reasonable to explore what its terms are. The domain is an invitation to debate and 
dialogue. At the same time there can be general arguments for an ontology or theory of 
being, and then more specific versions or applications of the same. One might make a 
case for a variety of realism and do so in terms of general concepts such as agency and 
structure, or specific contexts such as gendered agency or money or the corporation. 
This is ontology as specified theory. It creates issues in terms of the link between 
realism as philosophy and what is real based on substantive claims. Without these the 
whole becomes vulnerable in a different way - unresponsive as some form of 
Lakatosian hardcore. The issues are not irrelevant for general philosophical claims 
regarding an ontology, because any form of realism must involve demonstrable claims 
about the nature of reality, but this is a different order of argument than whether 
ontology has merit as a domain of argument (since theory etc. has at least a tacit 
ontology).  
The point here is that maintaining the distinctions (ontology, realism, what is real) 
is important, but creates significant grounds for confusion, since there is a tendency to 
integrate claims such that: this theoretical position, this explanation based on these 
methods is both realistic and well justified (and so the best account of - this aspect of - 
reality). Clearly, there is nothing wrong with making such a claim, without such claims 
explanation ceases to be a meaningful enterprise. It remains the case that ultimately 
theory should be judged as theory and based on its explanatory success or failure - so it 
may actually be the case that a post-Keynesian or Marxist or an ecological economist 
has ‘the best on the books’ account subject to justification which others may be 
persuaded of. Moreover, when the underlying practices change, so must our 
philosophies and social theories. In this sense, in the long run philosophy must be 
consistent with the findings of science (see Patomäki, 2010). However, analytically a 
distinction can still be made between ontology as a domain, realism as philosophy, and 
what is claimed to be real and this distinction has been an important one within 
economics because of the recent history of the sociology of knowledge within 
economics.   
If distinctions are not carefully stated then ontology can claim too much because 
an ontology expands to fill the domain of ontology, and in so doing may deploy the 
language of ‘realism’ to position any subsequent work as more realistic and so a priori 
‘correct’ - creating a problem of presumption that insulates a discourse from proper 
critique - providing its adherents with a dangerous sense of mission and certainty (not 
least by confusing philosophy with social science rather than recognizing one feeds the 
other). This does not have to be an intent nor does it have to be a fully accurate 
description of a state of affairs for the possibility to be damaging. It can involve 
(mis)inference by interlocutors. Despite being about multiple positions, Garfinkel tends 
to collapse together all aspects of an ontological argument in his development of 
contrast explanation. He does so partly because his argument is not also positioned as 
ontology. This does not invalidate any of Garfinkel’s substantial arguments. But it does 
highlight, a difference of degree in how Lawson’s work has developed and been 
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articulated within the context of economics. One might suggest that its problem field 
has influenced the strategic shape of realism as social ontology in economics. However, 
Lawson’s work cannot be reduced to mere instrumental strategies of intervention for 
that field.  
Lawson has repeatedly made it clear that his work is not a replacement for 
particular schools or theory, and is not exclusively aligned with a particular approach or 
method (1997, 2003). As ontology it is part of an open discourse for dialogue and 
debate, and as a philosophical position (a social ontology – realism) it serves an ‘under-
labouring’ function. However, as social ontology it also explores the nature of aspects 
of reality, as it is claimed to be (particular institutions, corporations, money etc.), and so 
can involve more or less substantive claims. It is in this latter sense that Lawson 
positions his own use of contrastive question forms. They are positioned as an 
explanatory approach to what is posited to be real, a further step into the realm of social 
science. The social ontology provides the grounds for consistent application of contrast 
explanation in the social realm (related to economy), but the ontology also includes 
explicit distinctions, such that one does not inadvertently blur the difference between 
ontology, realism, social theory and claims regarding what is real. Instead the 
conditionality and contingency at every stage continues to be emphasised.    
For van Fraassen and Garfinkel, contrastive questions are part of the general 
framework that any well-stated causal explanatory investigation must take. For 
Garfinkel contrastive question forms are also basic to the argument for why society is 
relational (the demonstrated relevance of relative relational contrastive question forms 
establishes something about society, and particular applications then demonstrate the 
superiority of contrast spaces extended along macro-state structural lines). For Lawson, 
contrast explanation is more modestly stated as one possible way to approach 
investigation of social reality (aspects of an economy).20 However, the form a contrast 
explanation takes is intended to be consistent with the social ontology he has previously 
developed. As we set out below, this cannot prevent there being some issues of 
ambiguity in Lawson’s development of contrast explanation. On the other hand, as we 
also illustrate, the general consistency flowing from Lawson’s social ontology does 
stand in stark contrast to the potential misunderstanding of the scope of explanation and 
investigation that continues in the mainstream.  
  
Lawson on social ontology  
 
In the previous sections we have set out van Fraassen and Garfinkel’s work on contrast 
explanation. Van Fraassen says little about what would be particular to society that 
would then create grounds for how contrast explanation should be deployed. Garfinkel 
is more specific in terms of the nature of things that can be explained and how they 
might be explained. For him the point of contrastive questions is to explore our 
presuppositions defining the boundaries of the realm for which the explanation holds. It 
is not only that we need to limit negation and create a determinate sense of what will 
count as the consequent ‘not’ happening (x rather than y), the point is also to specify the 
kind of thing for which an explanation can hold. “B-ness will explain A-ness only for 
the kind of thing that X is.” (Garfinkel 1981, p. 30-9). Garfinkel opposes reductionism 
                                                          
20 Also Lawson notes in Reorienting Economics that Garfinkel’s use of contrast explanation is applied 
and focuses mainly on known causes rather than seeking unknown or previously unconsidered 
unobservables (Lawson, 2003: p. 309).  
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and individualism, especially in social sciences, and stresses the relational nature of 
many social and other phenomena. 
While in agreement about the relational nature of society, Lawson’s use of 
contrast explanation is somewhat different in so far as it flows from his approach to 
social ontology. When the explanandum X consists of events (such as price movements 
or quantities of materials or outputs), then typically the only patterns that can be found 
are partial and unstable demi-regularities. This is due to the openness of social systems. 
From a causal explanation point of view, the underlying structures and conditions are 
more important than the empirical patterns only. This implies a distinction between 
events and what causes events (something that is ambiguous in van Fraassen’s work, 
but does not place overwhelming emphasis on macrostate explanation as one might 
infer from Garfinkel). For Lawson a mechanism is a way of acting or working of a 
structured thing. He argues that a fundamental role for contrastive explanation is 
identifying causal mechanisms in open systems. 
Lawson develops an account of emergent layers of reality and a social ontology 
that makes sense of causation at the emergent level of society. Causation arises from 
social activity based on the powers or capacities of a range of relevant entities. Entities 
are real in so far as they have capacity to bring about causal effects (this is the realist 
causal criterion of existence). Causation is conceived along broadly Aristotelian lines to 
also include material cause as well as effective cause, and so includes the conditions of 
possibility of any activity as well as the active agent of any particular event. Society and 
economy are historical and spatial, cumulatively shifting causal processes.  
Emergent entities are real, and both causally and ontologically irreducible to the 
elements relationally organised as components, since the organising structure also 
matters; without the (particular) organising structures (that are external to the elements 
organised as components) there would be no (particular) emergent entities. Here, 
Lawson’s social ontology clarifies what is left unexplored by van Fraassen. Social 
reality crucially includes emergent sentient entities (us) that produce and reproduce 
society around them in multifaceted ways, and the society that is produced and 
reproduced includes other emergent entities, which in turn position, constrain and 
enable the activity of people. Those entities range across recognizable sets of bounded 
relationally organised totalities positioned under various legal and other descriptions, 
generically referred to as communities (involving rights and obligations), such as 
limited liability corporations. From this point of view, there is a single multi-form and 
multi-level reality, including social reality, and, as such, any adequate attempt to 
theorize and investigate that reality must both be aware of commonality and difference. 
From the point of view of Lawson’s social ontology an adequate economics is 
differentiated by focus and emphasis from other social inquiry, rather than by any 
radical difference in its object of study. This does not prevent economics being a 
(branch of) social science, when science as practice is appropriately conceived. 
 For Lawson, there are many participants within a society, many different 
positions, interests and goals, and many possible ways in which a society may 
internalise principles of social activity directed at change, perhaps within discourses of 
progress and development. These in turn involve different consequences for change in 
so far as principles can be inherently more divisive, competitive and disintegrating, or 
conversely more cohesive, cooperative and integrating. There are also differences and 
intra- and interactions between specific societies within the wider whole of the global 
capitalist economy. This evolving complexity makes relative stability, under a deeper 
description, quite different from regular connections between things or events. Again, 
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for Lawson social reality is, as stated, recognizably a historical and spatial, shifting 
cumulatively causal process.         
Clearly, much of the above resonates with claims made by many prominent non-
mainstream economists over the decades. The ontology has been sufficiently general to 
act as supporting argument, when specified, for work drawing on Keynes, Marx, 
Veblen, Hayek etc. extending all the way to ecological economics (since it is implicit to 
any adequate account of social ontology that an emergent social reality is grounded in 
the limits of material reality), and gender (since any social relation may have some 
gendered aspect). However, in so far as mainstream theory, concepts and use of 
methods assume or are dependent on or seek to identify forms of atomistic regular 
relations in events, they are intrinsically problematic. They are by virtue of ontology at 
odds with the social world they investigate and so are questionable as a scientific 
project. For example, being at or moving toward equilibrium is not capable of 
explaining any real tendency, process or outcome in political economy, given the kinds 
of things economy and society are. In relatively closed physical systems, where the 
basic forces are stable and laws precisely measurable and expressible in a mathematical 
form, calculating an equilibrium position or movement can have predictive (or at least 
postdictive) power, but not so in economics. In economics, it is a property of formal 
models and a solution to a system of equations, with limited connection to the real 
world.21 Following this critical social ontology Lawson introduction of contrast 
explanation is relatively straightforward.   
 
Lawson on contrast explanation 
 
For Lawson, the primary goal of science, natural or social, is to identify and explore 
(with a view to explanation), the causes of phenomena of interest (Lawson, 2003, 2009). 
Whilst others also accept this goal, the open and complex nature of social reality usually 
encourages the view that one must simplify in the sense of employing accepted-as-
unrealistic assumptions. These assumptions deform the essential internal and causal 
relations of the actual complexity that one intends to investigate. The tendency to so 
proceed is exacerbated if one conceives of science as a search for law-like underlying 
regularities (strict or stochastic) of events. For Lawson, instead, contrast explanation 
can be used to inform a more adequate and nuanced investigation that can concern itself 
with real causal processes that occur in time and space. Contrasts are important in 
prompting the investigation and in revealing what may be significant: 
 
Rather than to seek to explain some outcome x, the goal is to explain some 
contrast ‘x rather than y’ and to do so in conditions where we might have 
expected the contrasted outcomes to be the same, because, as far as we could 
discern, they shared the same causal history. The approach thus turns on 
                                                          
21 When the term “equilibrium” is discussed in the language of economy, it has many competing 
meanings. Equilibrium theorists in economics do not know what an “efficient equilibrium” would 
designate in the real, concrete world (outside their abstract models). Even if there were a concretely 
specifiable equilibrium in some sense in a given market, neoclassical models would have nothing to say 
about how to get there. Besides, if an acceptable specification of a market allows for one equilibrium, it 
will typically allow for many. Even if the specification of the market were based on realistic assumptions, 
any of these equilibria would be Pareto optimal, and if there were a clearly specified way of getting 
there—none of these conditions are usually fulfilled and in all likelihood can never be fulfilled – these 
models say nothing about whether efficiency in, say, the financial markets would actually enhance the 
efficiency of the economy as a whole. (Lawson 1997, pp. 86–92; 2005). 
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explaining differences in outcomes, but differences that, from the point of view of 
existing understandings, are considered to be surprising, noteworthy, inconsistent, 
disturbing, doubt-inducing or otherwise interesting. (Lawson, 2009, p. 407) 
 
Clearly, the phrasing here is broad in terms of what provokes an investigation (see 
Morgan, 2013). In a formal sense there seems some ambiguity between a contrast 
question that is recognized for the purposes of explanation, why x occurred rather than 
y, and what kind of anticipation results in the focus, since the scope for varieties of y 
that make x stand out seems great. For example, must x be different than what has 
previously occurred, and so rather than refers to what is different by observation (x is 
different from y that occurred previously, and one might anticipate y), or can x refer to 
something that did not change, where one anticipated change, and so rather than refers 
to what is the same by observation (x is different from y, but x is what occurred 
previously and one anticipated y, which did not occur now or previously)?  
The question then becomes, what conditions are conducive to the identification of 
aspects of causal processes? For Lawson, if one is to explore a causal process then the 
most conducive environment will be where our best understandings lead us to expect, 
over a specific space, similarity of outcomes of two phenomena within the space.22 
Under such conditions there is reason to suppose that where expectations are 
contradicted, the relevant difference can be accounted for by only one (or at least a 
small set of) factor(s). The contradiction of expectation gives sense to his use of 
‘surprise’. To be surprised presupposes a level of understanding, a contrast (with what 
was expected, and a (set of) outcome(s) and relations on which that expectation was 
based). These in turn provide an implicit contrast space. Curiosity draws us to such set 
ups.23    
So a contrast question ‘why x rather than y’ is pursued where environments 
involved are believed to be similar if not the same. This, when formally designed, (and 
with the introduction of a single controlled change) is the basis of natural scientific 
laboratory experiment. As Lawson notes, this is a special case: one creates a highly 
controlled environment in order to isolate and manipulate causal powers to demonstrate 
a reproducible effect (where the power can manifest through a consistent relation). 
However, this kind of experiment is rarely possible in open systems. Instead, one can 
start from surprising outcomes or more generically one can look for conditions where 
‘causal histories’ provide grounds to expect that outcomes will be similar. So, one can 
look for a local relative closure (of ‘concomitance’) in which one would expect the 
same outcomes, events, tendencies etc. to continue, or look across localities in the same 
way. The more similar the causal history is expected to be then the more aligned one 
would expect phenomena to be, and, in principle, the easier it might be to orient on a 
particular cause of any arising difference.    
When stated in the abstract the basis of contrast explanation seems simple and 
highly reasonable. There is a context of comparison within which differences are 
believed to be limited in some way conducive to the investigation. Whether differences 
                                                          
22  Thereafter, of any actual one with all the remaining, or with a (rough) average or with a specific other; 
this may be over time or at a point in time, apply to a specific form or its absence, and so on. 
23  For Lawson, contrast explanation is seen to be operative, if implicitly, at all levels of social life. This 
does not make it any less useful to science; a significant difference is the understandings that a scientist 
holds at any point, and so the potential for being surprised (by events that contradict his or her scientific 
understandings). Lawson does also extend the approach to contrasts that might reasonably have been held 




are sufficiently limited is based on a judgement about conditions operating over some 
contrast space. Note how this use of ‘contrast space’ is different to how the term is used 
by van Fraassen and Garfinkel. The former introduces it as the space in which multiple 
questions by differently positioned persons can interrogate an event, and the latter 
defines it as the space in which an expanding set of contrastive questions can be asked, 
based also on values. However, Lawson’s use has a family resemblance, since it is a 
context in which difference is recognizably bounded. Lawson’s main point is that the 
contrast space provides conditions that facilitate a causal investigation. The idea is to 
identify a mechanism or mechanisms causally responsible for the contrast.  
It is worth mentioning here that Lawson’s approach can address some of the 
motivating concerns of van Fraassen and Garfinkel. The contrasts identified depend on 
the position of the observer (see Lawson, 1999, p. 40). A Schumpeterian, a Keynesian, 
or a feminist etc., may not find a given event surprising or surprising in the same way, 
and so proceed in very different ways. Yet, different contrasts for a specific event X, 
identified by differently situated investigators, can lead to the uncovering of a set of 
causal mechanisms each contributing to the observed outcome X. This is not necessarily 
judgmentally relative:      
 
From the perspective of contrastive explanation theory, however, we can see that 
neither a plethora of contradictory voices nor a commitment to judgmental 
relativism is inevitable. The prevalence of many different voices, even if all are 
considering the same phenomenon, may merely reflect a focus upon different 
contrasts. The investigation of different contrasts can lead to a variety of causes 
being pursued and perhaps uncovered. For example, suppose we focus on the 
U.K. productivity record in the post-World War II period. Even if all of our 
observers are economic historians, each may note a different contrast to the others 
and so pursue a different cause. For example, one of our economic historians may 
notice that the productivity record in question is better than the prewar U.K. 
record and pursue the factor responsible (perhaps the postwar expansion of 
demand). Another may notice that the postwar productivity performance of the 
U.K. is below that of many otherwise comparable industrialized countries over the 
same period and ponder on the causal factor responsible (perhaps Britain’s 
relatively unique system of localized industrial bargaining). And so on. (Lawson, 
1999, p. 40) 
 
As we noted in the first section, over recent decades economics has continued to change 
and innovate. Part of that change has been the rise of a discourse of field experiments, 
natural experiments and some use of laboratory experiment (see e.g. Leamer, 1983). 
This has become in recent years the ‘empirical turn’ and ‘credibility revolution’ in 
economics (Angrist and Pischke, 2010). Lawson’s introduction of contrast spaces as a 
restricted locality conducive to contrast explanation clearly occupies some of the same 
terrain; particularly that of natural experiments (an observable context in which arising 
differences are limited; see Morgan, 2013). However, it does so based on quite different 
conceptions. 
Much of the debate concerning the credibility revolution indicates a great deal of 
the broader debate concerning natural and field experiment has been captured by 
concerns regarding how to produce and test regularity. Often experiment and quasi-
experiment have simply become ways to specify a space in which an econometric 
model and test can be applied (and in others an econometric model has become the basis 
of a pseudo experiment). As such, and as Leamer (2010) states in his response to the 
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new credibility revolution literature, the same issues of ‘con’ continue to apply that 
inspired his initial critique within econometrics. Experiment has not become a solution 
to the problems in the econometrics, but rather a different way to express them: 
problems of control, problems of comprehensive variables, well-specified models etc 
continue to apply.24 At the same time, much of the work based on laboratory experiment 
for behavioural economics, has combined problems of genuine control with questions 
regarding how realistic and relevant the stated isolations are beyond the laboratory. In 
all cases, the problem has been typically posed in terms of transitions from internal to 
external validity. That is, the generalisability of the regularity-claims. What can be 
claimed remains subordinate to how a significant economic relation is conceived, which 
in turn remains mainly subordinate to how it is measured. The basics remain confused 
even as economics has developed. The analytical distinction between ontology, realism 
and what is real notwithstanding, Lawson holds that the possibility and effectiveness of 
experiment in science lends credence to realist ontology (2003, p.103). The aim is to 
isolate and then trigger a mechanism and see how it works, with transfactual 
implications.25   
 
Lawson’s illustrations of contrast explanation and their limits 
 
For Lawson, the main focus of contrast explanation is the real causal powers that 
provide the explanation of events or phenomena of interest. He stresses that although 
relative closures are always local in some sense, social scientists are especially 
interested in exploring scenarios where the contrast appears on wide scales of time 
and/or space (a slightly different emphasis than Garfinkel’s macrostate). Lawson 
provides three main examples that highlight the limits of inferences that can be drawn 
based on contrast explanation investigation. These can be considered in logical order for 
the purpose of illustration rather than chronological order. 
First, in Reorienting Economics, and in the later Reddaway article he uses the 
example of crop yields in a field (2003). This is the point of departure used by Leamer 
in his classic ‘con’ paper (1983). According to Lawson, crop yields will tend to be 
similar within a field unless some given factor affects those yields: more shade, a 
change in soil PH, drainage, proximity to a river etc. Second, in the Reddaway paper 
                                                          
24 One should note here that Leamer’s critique is not fundamental. He has been arguing for better tests 
and more stringent application of tests since the 1970s; notably the use of fragility or extreme bound tests, 
creating a meta-analytical synthesis approach where only a few variables survive from the many used 
across models for any given focus of study. This is a classic example of the problem stated in the first 
section: a discourse in which continual failure becomes a hallmark of the activity of science rather than a 
reason to acknowledge that the whole may fail to be scientific (the whole can never be perfect but we 
continue to pursue rigour based on the best available of these types of methods). 
25 This is constitutive of the tension in ontological argument. Though ontology is a domain within which 
different claims are possible one then makes claims and can do so based on substantive approaches to 
ontology that may in turn be subjects of criticism. Note: the term ‘transfactual’ means that generative 
structures, forces and mechanisms retain their identity and mode of operation across factual contexts, 
although their actual effects depend on those contexts. This implies that actual causation is normally 
complex, which resonates with Mackie’ INUS-definition of cause. This actually further enlarges the 
contrast space and pragmatic and value-based reasons to adopt a particular explanation. What we single 
out as the cause depends largely on our practical capacities and expectations of normality. For instance, 
normally when explaining fire, the presence of oxygen is just part of the background, but the presence of 
the oxygen, too, can be seen as the cause of the fire, say in a laboratory or in a factory, where special 
precautions are taken to exclude oxygen (Mackie, 1980). All INUS conditions are real and implicate real 
powers (structured entities with the power or tendency to manifest particular characteristic properties X 
and produce outcomes O). Indeed, what makes the relevant difference depends very much on the context. 
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Lawson (2009) reconstructs Akerlof’s (1970) ‘market for lemons’ argument concerning 
adverse selection and information asymmetries. Third, in Economics & Reality, he 
discusses the already noted case of Britain’s relatively low rate of productivity growth 
from the late 19th century to the 1980s, as compared with that achieved by most other 
industrial countries (1997). 
 Lawson’s first example of crop yields is a useful illustration of a highly restricted 
set of differences, but it is likely not representative of many economic subjects of 
interests. It is a situation where the link between observation and the causal constituents 
of some phenomena are relatively well understood and where the operation of each 
possible factor can readily be considered in parts. It is also one in which there is no 
great controversy regarding the overall framework of theory relevant to the matter under 
observation (crop yields). It is the closest approximation to laboratory conditions one 
might find in a social context (and is also for other purposes a subject of laboratory 
experiment by corporations). One can consider it an economic example in so far as 
agricultural output is an economic issue and agriculture is part of an economy. But 
many kinds of issues are far less easily decomposed into their components based on a 
link between an observable outcome and an identifiable contrast space that seems 
readily bounded; and few such contrast spaces seem likely to be intrinsically limited in 
a way most conducive to uncontestable contrast explanations within those bounds. This, 
of course, is key to Garfinkel’s work. Unemployment, inflation, debt levels, income and 
wealth inequality, well-being etc are not just phenomena of interest that may arise in a 
contrast space, they are also relational rather than simply events or outcomes as end 
states of other relations, and highly contested in terms of how they are constituted, and 
this includes at different scales and based on different conceptions within different 
broadly based frameworks as theorisations. 
Lawson is clearly aware of the problems here. He is by no means making 
grandiose claims for contrast explanation based on unconvincing examples. Rather he 
too is attempting to convince that despite the inherent problems of any empirical 
investigation, contrast explanation remains worthwhile. He specifically differentiates 
explanation based on well-understood causal mechanisms from attempts to explain what 
is not well understood (2009). He then also differentiates between pure explanation and 
applied explanation. Pure explanation of the x under scrutiny involves positing some 
previously unknown (perhaps by analogy) mechanism (structures, activity agents etc), 
creating theory, which is then empirically assessed for adequacy. Applied explanation 
involves intervention into causal complexes based on cumulative theory.  
Inter alia, Lawson’s distinction between pure and applied theory is a response to 
the criticism that, in practice, not all researchers ‘start by 'retroducing' from some 
surprising ['demi-reg'], rather [they are] guided by more abstract and fundamental 
theoretical propositions’ (Arestis, Brown & Sawyer 2002). Brown in particular argues 
that there are in fact regularities at the level of system (capitalism) and Marx and other 
theorists focus on these through abstraction. Though one might dispute the way 
regularity is redefined in the critique it remains the case that a system as a whole must 
have emergent properties and these can be expressed in a comprehensive theoretical 
position. Theory and a grasp of what is emergent can readily combine, since one needs 
to know how the parts are connected, because those interconnections affect the ways in 
which the whole is different from the mere sum of its parts. This is essential also for 
many local explanations. One might then infer that contrast explanation may not be the 




However, for Lawson, contrast explanation provides one way in which empirical 
adequacy is explored, and as such fits into a ‘dialectic’ of knowledge or learning. It is 
not exclusive and its findings are not definitive. It is in any case an ordinary part of 
putting the conception of reality to the test (a basic of the genuine practice of fallibility). 
There is always an ‘achieved level’ of understanding or knowledge of a domain, which 
gives rise to expectations for what will occur within that domain. This expectation may 
then be challenged by observation, and this creates the grounds that provoke contrast 
explanations, which in turn become part of the process by which any and all 
understandings (including theory) of the domain may be reformulated or revised. One 
can thus, in principle, apply contrast explanation in much more complex situations than 
that indicated by the crop yield example and do so in variously directed ways that also 
are informed by different positions and theory. The problem remains that complex, 
macrohistorical, and ethically and political loaded developments are all too easy to 
interpret from a wide variety of perspectives and theorist can perhaps become overly 
committed to a single conditioning position.26 However, this is not a problem created by 
contrast explanation it is a collective problem of any knowledge seeking investigation. 
According to Lawson, one can explore a contrast explanation in a way that limits the 
complexity that is investigated, whilst not deforming the investigative process. This, of 
course, is an empirical claim and in the end is either demonstrated or not.  
Lawson’s second example of contrast explanation sheds some light on this. This is 
his reconstruction of Akerlof’s seminal paper on adverse selection. Akerlof does not use 
the language of contrast explanation or of causal processes, where some tendency is 
heavily influenced by a particular factor within the process. However, according to 
Lawson the focus of the paper is implicitly contrastive, since Akerlof is concerned with 
why second hand cars are (surprisingly) significantly cheaper than new ones (rather 
than similar); it is not about how prices for markets are determined (which would be far 
broader in terms of its actual focus). The operative process is relatively easily identified 
because there is ample evidence for the institutions, organizations and sets of relations 
and logics that affect the outcome (second hand cars are cheaper). The posited 
explanation is that the buyer has less information regarding the quality of the car than 
the seller. Sellers know whether they hold a good or a defective car, but buyers do not. 
Because of the absence of trust, the market price is likely to be somewhere in between 
the value of a good and defective car. This makes selling a recently new car as second 
hand less appealing and particularly to those with ‘good’ new cars, and so the second 
hand market becomes skewed towards ‘lemons’, exacerbating problems over time.  
Clearly, the core mechanism identified from Akerlof puts aside many potentially 
significant aspects that may also be causally significant: cars are status goods where the 
model, age of the car and plate matter to the owner, so depreciation may reflect the 
                                                          
26 Systematic empirical studies about expert judgements show that experts ‘neutralize dissonant data and 
preserve confidence in their prior assessments by resorting to a complex battery of belief- system 
defenses that, epistemologically defensible or not, make learning from history a slow process and 
defections from theoretical camps a rarity’ (Tetlock 1999, p. 335; see also Tetlock 2005). For instance, 
many critical political economists relying on Keynesian reasoning, such as Arestis, Brown & Sawyer 
(2002), argued before and at the time of the introduction of the euro that the economic impact of the euro 
and its accompanying institutions is likely to be deflationary and destabilising; that the political impact is 
profoundly undemocratic; and that the social consequences are likely to be deleterious. Another possible 
but less relevant and much more ambivalent source of criticism has been the optimal currency area 
(Robert Mundell, who developed the theory, has been an enthusiastic supporter of the euro; see Patomäki 
2013, 60-4). We are not aware of any mainstream economist who would have adopted a (post) Keynesian 
framework because of the euro crisis. When critical lessons are drawn, they are based on the optimal 
currency area theory, or on other neoclassical conceptions, or on ad hoc explanations. 
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degree of status orientation of consumers. The market may also be affected by financing 
and credit availability within the current state of the economy, or by changes in 
regulation related to emissions or fuel taxes. The situation may also reflect the lack of 
institutions to compensate for information asymmetries. However, Lawson does claim 
that one can draw further inferences from the role of given institutions, relations and 
practices as general forms with causal implications, applicable elsewhere. This follows 
analogously though more complexly from the simple contrast explanation argument 
begun with the crop yield example. The core of Akerlof’s argument and the basic 
mechanism identified by Lawson is a ‘low trust information differential’.27 Still, one 
must acknowledge that there is also a difference in the terms of transition or 
generalisability based on more complex social relational contexts. The car market has 
an identified causal history, but the generalisability of this is about the nature of a non-
specified set of concepts as a causal process (which cannot have an actual history - 
adverse selection or a low trust information differential as a mechanism in general). A 
from-as claim is of a different order as generalisable than a crop yield variation readily 
identified between two places. In any case, Lawson makes no attempt to equate these 
arguments, so no error of reasoning is committed and the difference does not prevent 
the inferences regarding causal implications from being insightful or useful. 
However, it does follow that claims continue to be contestable, and in this sense 
contrast explanation is just like any scientific approach. This is clear from Lawson’s 
third example (1997, pp.255-6), one briefly touched upon already, which compares 
different possible contrast spaces for UK productivity growth. Lawson notes that in 
terms of an earlier/later contrast, focussing on one country and particular period of time, 
Britain’s productivity growth was higher during the early post-war period than it had 
been for most of the preceding century. This suggests possible explanations such as 
war-time technological developments or post-war boom in world trade. If one sets a 
different contrast space but focusses on the same X event or outcome, namely the level 
of UK productivity growth in the period immediately following the war, one generates 
different why-questions and different possible answers. When Britain’s productivity 
performance until the 1980s is compared to that of other industrial countries, it turns out 
to have been slower. Lawson attributes at least part of the responsibility for the 
relatively slow productivity growth in the UK to path-dependent development that led 
to a more decentralised system of collective bargaining than elsewhere. Britain’s history 
of the craft-based local worker organisation created a situation where resistance against 
technological changes was relatively strong. 
For this explanation Lawson draws on  an account of new production processes 
introduced without negotiation leading to workers resisting technological change. This 
may well account for the British experience but is contestable in terms of its 
generalisibility. Unions can be part of a mechanism fostering technological dynamism 
in various ways. In its heyday, Swedish social democracy included the Rehn-Meidner 
model as its key component (this is also an interesting case of a deliberately created 
large-scale social mechanism). The Rehn-Meidner model was based on solidaristic 
wage policy but also encouraged firms to make technological innovations, by squeezing 
low-productivity firms and industries. It also helped adjustments to the technological 
dynamism of the capitalist world economy by means of an active labour-market policy: 
                                                          
27 This begs the question, what is trust and how does it operate in different circumstances (see for 
example, Morgan and Sheehan, 2015)? 
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unemployed were retrained and moved to new employment by the state. 28 One might 
infer from this that a contrast explanation does not have generalisable features in the 
way the Akerlof example seems to indicate. However, all it indicates is that it does not 
necessarily have this feature unless demonstrated in the particular case, which is no 
more than to suggest general specification of interesting causal mechanisms need not 
apply in the same way in different places or at all. This is not a defect of contrast 
explanation per se, but rather a claim that one should not expect too much (including 
universality) from any empirical investigation.       
However, the point remains that the concept of a contrast space provides a basis 
for empirical investigation that can then seek to explore many causal factors, with some 
link to what may or may not turn out to be a main factor; and a mere surprise relative to 
current understandings may be all that is required to get an explanatory project going. 
Explanatory claims that result are all potentially corrigible, and these may also be 
highly partial: ‘where the causes bearing on some phenomenon are many, it may well be 
that any applied explanatory endeavour can, at best, achieve only a highly partial 
explanation of some concrete phenomenon under some of its aspects.’ (Lawson, 2009, 
p. 410). The implication is then that contrast explanation is modest in its claims to what 
it can achieve. Lawson argues that it is by synthesising underlying commonalities of 
significant causal processes that one can make claims for generalisability that then 
create the basis for new more specific contrast explanation investigations.  
 
Conclusion: what contrast explanation can and cannot contribute to 
 
Just as in the case of van Fraassen and Garfinkel, Lawson introduces contrast 
explanation in a particular context for particular purposes. He explicitly introduces it as 
a consistent addition to, and development from, his work on social ontology. Lawson’s 
use of contrast explanation is given meaning both by its roots in his work on social 
ontology and the state of economics that provides the grounds for the critique contained 
in that social ontology. It is not entirely clear that, for Lawson, contrast explanation is 
the general framework for any and all explanatory causal investigations and it remains 
the case that there can be many ways to constructively explore an economic issue (see 
Morgan 2015a; 2016b). Moreover, contrast explanation as set out by Lawson is an 
approach not a method; at least in terms of the connotations the latter term usually 
carries. ‘Method’ typically indicates some tightly, often technically, defined procedure, 
such as an OLS regression or use of a Lickert scale. As an approach, contrast 
explanation is nonetheless insightful and useful in terms of exploring the question-
answer logic of causal explanations and highlighting the ontological, epistemological, 
pragmatic, ethical and political assumptions that scientific questions necessarily 
involve.   
Lawson’s particular use of contrast explanation presupposes value in reorienting 
explanatory endeavour on phenomena with similar causal histories. This seems 
reasonable. At the same time, it immediately invokes Mill’s problem of limitation: how 
does one restrict the causal history and select from it? This is a basic problem for 
science of any kind and for empirical investigation in general. Lawson’s argument is 
                                                          
28 Another possibility is the ‘negotiated involvement’ model of relations of production, which involves 
workers directly intervening in the introduction of a process. This would provide ‘functional flexibility’ 
of working practices instead of ‘neo-liberal flexibility’ of wages and working conditions. For an excellent 
analysis of the rise and decline of the Swedish model, and discussion on the promises of the ‘functional 
flexibility’ model, see Ryner 2002; for an assessment and further discussion, Patomäki 2003. 
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ultimately that the well informed social scientist makes these decisions and that social 
ontology can help provide an underlying understanding of causal processes, and so 
orient how one looks and what one looks for. Here, one must acknowledge that contrast 
explanation can only be a further domain of argument for a constructive or structured 
pluralism (see Dow, 2004; Dobusch and Kapeller, 2012). It can be a domain in which 
one differentiates between multiple theories or frameworks as plausibly different 
perspectives on the same phenomenon. For example, a Schumpeterian view of x, a 
Keynesian view of x, a gendered view of x, an ecological view of x; a focus on agency, 
a focus on structure etc. Moreover, because it can invoke different points of departure it 
can be a way to explore different theories of the same phenomenon that make claims 
about the same explanatory process. For example, how money is created, what causes 
inequality, etc. These may be in competition or direct contradiction so contrast 
explanation may bear on these.  
In the end contrast explanation offers but one further way in which different 
theorizations can be engaged in debate, dialogue, and development, and perhaps can be 
discarded. That is all it can offer, and one must also accept here that, particularly in the 
social sciences, reality may be significantly under-determined by theory, and several 
theories may account for the same phenomena of interest. This is not a problem 
arbitrarily created by philosophy of science or social science but a real issue they have 
struggled with. Lawson is an optimist here, he places great weight on a dialectic of 
learning. In the end, of course, economists are either committed to such learning or are 
not. Psychologists tend to argue we are rather worse at this than we tend to think we are. 
However, for Lawson, the greatest impediment to progress in economics is not a world 
that is under-determined by theory (so there can be several possible theories that remain 
unfalsified); but rather the existence of theory that never quite has to justify its 
realisticness or relevance in the first place. Instead, it is based on premises and uses 
methods that are problematic by virtue of what they suggest about the nature of reality.  
However the field actually develops in the future, Lawson’s contribution to 
economics has been profound. In a recent paper in Journal of Economic Methodology 
David Colander (2013) argued that methodologists of economics bear some of the 
responsibility for the parlous state of the field (and for the global financial crisis in 
particular). This is because, as a sub-discipline, methodology has become supine, and 
concerned acritically with what concerns the dominant tendencies in the rest of 
economics.29 This is not something one could ever suggest regarding Lawson’s work. If 
we return to the point from where we began, Lawson’s work has helped to reinvigorate 
methodology and philosophy in economics and to transcend the sub-disciplinary 
boundaries constructed around them. Contrast explanation is another contribution to 
this. It offers something methodology in the abstract rarely does, a provisional way 
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